This is a fact-filled book written in a highly readable and
lively style. I found it very satisfying on several fronts, although I can
sympathize with some of the reviewers who disagree with Hal Brands’ point of view.
He makes no effort to hide where he is coming from, seeing the democratic West
as something worth defending, and the USA as the necessary guarantor to the
free world.
Brands draws upon the geopolitical theories and traditions of
Halford Mackinder, Alfred Thayer Mahan, Nicholas Spykman, and others. This is one
of the attractions of the book. As a trained geographer myself, I’ve always
thought that geopolitics was unfairly criticized for decades. Sure, it was originally
associated with the Swede Rudolf Kjellén and the German Friedich Ratzel both of
whom were something of social Darwinists and whose ideas were embraced by the Nazis.
Brand’s view is nuanced and his application of the perspective is intelligent. He
sums it up: “Geopolitics tempered by democracy was stark but rarely evil.
Geopolitics with an autocratic bent was poison, pure and simple” (p. 31). Bad
application of an approach should not be a reason to ban the entire discipline (for
example, genetics has been misused for bad purposes but it nevertheless is a
vital science).
The first two-thirds of the book is dedicated to a backward
look at the 20th century: the two World Wars, the Cold War, and the quarter
century of peace and prosperity following the fall of the Soviet Union. The final
part looks at the “second Eurasian century” which we are currently living and
draws lessons from the past.
It is easy to see why readers of a certain persuasion would
object to Brand’s interpretation. He readily acknowledges the American mistakes
and overreactions in building and defending a safe and free world. Often, in
defending democracy, America ended up crushing it and supporting oppressive
regimes that it saw to be on its side. Scores of people died in wars from Vietnam
to Iraq and many smaller skirmishes. However, Brand is unabashedly of the view
that the US-dominated world after World War II has been, in the balance, hugely
positive to everyone, and that US involvement in the world—especially the
central Eurasian continent and the surrounding seas—is a necessity for the world
and its people to prosper.
He does see the threat posed by rising isolationism.
Although the book was published in 2025, the manuscript must have been
completed prior to the November 2024 elections. Brand writes: “If America makes
a habit of electing aspiring strongmen, it may not remain a democratic
superpower. And don’t think for a second that troubled autocracies can’t bring
a world of woe” (p. 219). Unfortunately, it seems this is where we stand for
the moment.
Although a multipolar world would seem desirable at the face
of it, the contenders to fill the other pole posts—notably China and Russia—do
not provide an attractive alternative. In fact, these revisionist powers
represent illiberal authoritarian regimes that would limit free speech and
civil liberties in their spheres of influence. Western Europe without the US
will not be able to resist. Brand makes a strong case for a broad coalition of
democracies to cooperate, in terms of politics and policy, innovation and technology,
and military. Citing Harry Truman in 1948: “America must pay the price for
peace.” Brand’s final warning: “There is no law of nature that expansion must
fail and tyranny must be vanguished. There is no guarantee that history takes
the path of progress” (p. 245). As the
book shows, the 20th century history is full of examples where
things could have gone badly wrong.
